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Abstract
We estimate exit behavior in a repeated social dilemma situation with intergroup
mobility, using experimental data. Estimated results show that absolute levels of
cooperation of others in one’s own group is a signiﬁcant determinant. Also, the
diﬀerence between the absolute levels of cooperation and the cooperation index
based on a subject’s actual choices for cooperation, from the ﬁrst some periods,
is signiﬁcant. Information about other groups is not important. Based on these
results, we draw the following conclusions: (1) subjects care about the information
concerning their own group. (2) the higher the cooperation index for a subject, the
higher is the probability that he/she will move, given the same level of cooperation
of others.
JEL classiﬁcation: C91, H41
Keywords: Estimation, Exit behaviors, Free riding, mobility, laboratory experi-
ments
¤Department of Economics,
1-1 Gakuen-cho, Soka-shi,
Saitama 340-0042 Japan,
e-mail: fujiyama@dokkyo.ac.jp1 Introduction
Modern societies enjoy increasing mobility in such areas as job changes, accommodation
changes and immigration. Conversely there is the free-riding problem, manifested in
shirking in workplaces and a collapse of social norms.
According to the “folk theorem” of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game, there is
a relation between these two phenomena: mobility has negative eﬀects on cooperation.
Where there is no mobility, players continue to interact with each other in a ﬁxed group
or society. They know that free-riding will have harmful eﬀects on their future payoﬀs.
In situations where there is mobility, however, players can cut relationships with other
members of their group. As mobility increases, players care less about the harmful eﬀects
of free riding.
Conversely, there are positive eﬀects of mobility on cooperation in the coordination
game (Dieckmann (1999), Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2004), Oechssler (1997)). In
the well-known coordination game, there exist both a Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium and a
risk-dominant but ineﬃcient equilibrium. In the risk-dominant equilibrium there is an
advantage to risk taking. The decrease in a player’s payoﬀ that arises from making an
error in the risk-dominant equilibrium is less than in the Pareto-eﬃcient equilibrium. The
risk-dominant but ineﬃcient equilibrium is selected under various conditions (Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993), Ellison (1993), Young (1998)). If, however, there is a choice to
move into another group, the Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium may be preferred over the risk
dominant equilibrium. The logic is very simple. Players in the ineﬃcient group can exit
in order to change the action from the ineﬃcient one to the eﬃcient one.
The logic in the coordination game does not apply directly in the social/prisoners’
dilemma game. In the coordination game, all players wish to change to the eﬃcient
1action, so that the action of players who are moving into a group is desirable for players
who are in that group. On the other hand, in the social/prisoners’ dilemma game, the
non-cooperators aim to enjoy free riding by moving into another group. Because of these
free riders, the cooperators in the group do not continue to cooperate. Consequently, the
Pareto eﬃcient equilibrium is not supported by mobility.
In the social/prisoners’ dilemma game, the cooperators and the non-cooperators both
move. However, if there are diﬀerences in moving behavior between them, it is possible
that the best use of diﬀerences allows us to distinguish the cooperators from the non-
cooperators in a social/prisoners’ dilemma game.1 Less attention has been paid to actual
moving behavior in the social/prisoners’ dilemma game.2 There is a need for empirical
work to estimate this.
This paper examines a social dilemma experiment with intergroup mobility. We con-
ducted ten sessions. In each session there are 17 subjects and 4 groups. Subjects play a
social dilemma game within each group. After ﬁve times of play of the social dilemma
game, subjects have an exit option simultaneously. This process is repeated ten times.
We have 50 samples for cooperation decisions and 9 samples for moving decisions per
subject. From the ﬁrst 25 samples for cooperation decisions per subject, we calculated
an index of cooperation for each subject. With the last 4 samples for moving decisions,
we estimate moving behavior.
Our results are as follows. First, the absolute cooperation rate of others in one’s
own group have a negative eﬀect on decisions to move. Second, the diﬀerence between
the index of cooperation for each subject and the absolute cooperation rate of others in
one’s group has a positive eﬀect on decisions to move. From this result it follows that
1Concerning sorting eﬀects, see also Orbell and Dawes (1993) and Bohnet and Kubler (2005), Hayashi
(1993).
2The exception is Ehrhart and Keser (1999).
2the higher the index of cooperation of an individual, the higher is the probability that
this individual will move, given the same cooperation rate of others. Third, Information
about other groups is not important.
Ehrhart and Keser (1999) is a key work for examining cooperation and exit behav-
ior. However, they use the Spearman rank correlation coeﬃcient. With this technique,
an environment that subjects face are not suﬃciently controlled. Here, we use several
variables in estimation formula in order to control an environment faced by subjects.3
There is a drawback with the index of cooperation used by Ehrhart and Keser (1999),
in which the ratio of decisions to cooperate to all decisions is calculated. The marginal
beneﬁt from cooperation changes with the size of group, and this should be taken into
account. We use two diﬀerent indexes in our estimations. One index is the same as
that of Ehrhart and Keser (1999). Another is that with an appropriate adjustment.
It turns out that the adjustment is small in practice, and does not improve pseudo-
R2 of the estimation. Also, If we use all rounds to assemble the Ehrhart and Keser
(1999)’s cooperation index, its exogeneity is not assured. We therefore construct the
cooperative index from the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds, after which the estimation period begins.
Hence the cooperative index is predetermined. Also, if we interpret our index as a proxy
of cooperativeness of subjects, the errors-in-variables problem arises and the exogeneity
of the index is not assured. Hence our examination focuses on the eﬀect of an individual’s
previous experience. Our index is adequate because there is a correlation between our
cooperation index and the cooperation rate in the previous ﬁve rounds. The index is
good information to predict the cooperation behavior in the future.
In section 2 we outline the experimental design. Section 3 reports the estimations and
3Under a traditional experimental methodology, an environment are controlled rigorously by a exper-
imental design. On the other hand, it is important to reproduce exact situation examined, in this paper,
it is repetition of the social dilemma with intergroup mobility.
3the results for exit behavior. Section 4 presents conclusions.
2 Experimental Design
Our experiment consisted of ten sessions, utilizing 170 students in 4 Japanese universities
in or near Tokyo. There are 17 subjects in a session. Seats were assigned to them by
lottery in a large room with no partitions. They were connected by computers on a local
area network, and made decisions by clicking their mouse anonymously. All information
about the game was shown on a laptop computer display to each subject.
Structure of the game: The game was designed as follows:
1. at the start, subjects were assigned randomly to one of four groups by computer.
Each group had four or ﬁve subjects.
2. at a single stage, they played a social dilemma game within their groups.
3. in a round, they repeated ﬁve stages and then had an option to move to another
group.
4. in a session, ten rounds were repeated.
In total, subjects played the social dilemma game for 50 stages, with nine chances to exit
(Figure 1). It took about 45 minutes to complete 50 stages. Subjects did not know when
the session would ﬁnish.
4Figure 1: Structure of Experiment
Social Dilemma Game at Each Stage: At each stage, subjects received 20 yen
as a resource.4 They decided whether to provide it to their group as an investment
(“cooperation” or “C”) or to keep it (“non-cooperation” or “N”).
The rate of return depended on group size. Let n denote the number of all members
in a group and let m be the number of providers in the group.
In multiple-player groups (n ¸ 3), the investment was multiplied by 2. The payoﬀ
function, U(¢), is deﬁned as follows:
U(C) = 40
m
n
; U(N) = 40
m
n
+ 20: (1)
In two-player groups (n = 2), the investment was multiplied by 1.5:
U(C) = 30
m
2
= 15m; U(N) = 30
m
2
+ 20 = 15m + 20: (2)
In single-player groups (n = 1), the return was equal to the investment because there
4110 yen was about one U.S. dollar at the time of the experiment.
5were no “social” eﬀects:
U(C) = U(N) = 20: (3)
These payoﬀ functions satisfy Dawes (1980)’s conditions of social dilemmas, apart
from the single-player groups.5
Subjects were given an instruction and informed of this structure before the game.
They were also asked to complete two conﬁrmation tests to verify that they understood
the structure. Solutions were also provided by an instructor after the tests.
At the beginning of each stage, each subject saw on his/her computer display: all of
his/her past decisions and payoﬀs in the current round; each group’s size; each group’s
average payoﬀs at the previous stage and those in the current round; his/her total payoﬀ.
After making each decision, a subject was given the following information: the number
of providers in his/her group, his/her own decision, and payoﬀ at that stage.
Exit Options in the Round: After ﬁve stages, the subjects were simultaneously
oﬀered an exit option. The subjects decided which group to join in the next round; they
could choose to stay in the same group (Figure 2).
5Dawes (1980) gives a formal deﬁnition of social dilemmas. In a social dilemma,
1. persons have options of “cooperation” (voluntary contribution to the group) or “non-cooperation”
(non-contribution);
2. non-cooperation always provides higher payoﬀ than cooperation
3. but if everyone defects, they receive less payoﬀ than if everyone cooperates.
6Figure 2: Diagram of Game Structure
Subjects who chose another group had to pay moving costs. We considered three
distinct conditions: high moving costs, low costs, and no costs. The cost function, Cost(¢),
is deﬁned as follows:
Cost(E) = 50; Cost(S) = 0 in high cost condition; (4)
Cost(E) = 20; Cost(S) = 0 in low cost condition; (5)
Cost(E) = Cost(S) = 0 in no cost condition; (6)
where E denotes “Exiting”, and S “Staying”.
At the decision making to exit (or not), each subject saw on the computer display: all
group’s average payoﬀs at each stage in the current round, each group’s size and his/her
total payoﬀ earned in the current round, all group’s average payoﬀs in the current and
all past rounds.
7Total Payoﬀs: In summary, each subject earned a payoﬀ in the session as follows:
50 X
t=1
U(at) ¡
9 X
s=1
Cost(bs); (7)
where at 2 fC;Ng and bs 2 fE;Sg in each period t 2 f1;:::;50g, and s 2 f1;:::;9g.
Subjects knew that they would receive a monetary reward (in yen) equal to the payoﬀ
they earned in their session.6
3 Diﬀerences in Exit behavior
3.1 Descriptive statistics of sessions
Table 1 sets out descriptive statistics of sessions. At the macro level, we conﬁrm that
the mobility rates diﬀer signiﬁcantly with diﬀering moving costs.7 The cooperation rates
does not show such signiﬁcant diﬀerences, however. A parallel paper, Kobayashi, Koyama,
Fujiyama and Oura (2005), investigates the macro behavior more closely. Below, we focus
on individual behavior patterns (micro level analysis).
3.2 Data and Variables
A player has ﬁfty chances to cooperate or not, and nine chances to exit from a group (or
not) in a session.
To deﬁne an index of cooperation, we divide a sequence of data into two periods. This
is done in order to generate a predetermined variable for cooperation. We also change
6In fact they would receive 1,000 yen as a minimum reward, even if their earnings are less than 1000
yen. They did not know this in advance.
7According to the Kruskal-Wallis test, there are diﬀerences between the three conditions at the 5 %
signiﬁcance level. The test value is 7.875 (> 5:991).
8Cooperation Rate Mobility Rate Payoﬀs (yen)
session moving cost Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.)
1 50 0.349 (0.209) 0.203 (0.180) 1236.5 (171.9)
2 50 0.360 (0.184) 0.203 (0.116) 1228.2 (113.8)
3 50 0.256 (0.181) 0.209 (0.201) 1145.0 (181.7)
4 50 0.268 (0.178) 0.131 (0.116) 1203.9 (142.4)
5 20 0.295 (0.161) 0.327 (0.145) 1217.1 (111.8)
6 20 0.296 (0.207) 0.216 (0.210) 1223.7 (102.5)
7 20 0.395 (0.224) 0.281 (0.162) 1331.8 (199.3)
8 20 0.286 (0.163) 0.268 (0.166) 1218.8 ( 88.1)
9 0 0.288 (0.231) 0.693 (0.181) 1261.8 (100.1)
10 0 0.416 (0.186) 0.654 (0.178) 1381.2 (138.3)
All sessions 0.320 0.318 1244.8
The unit is the individual subject.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Sessions
the length of the ﬁrst and second periods and estimate the exit behavior; the results are
shown in Appendix 2.
The ﬁrst period consists of the ﬁrst 5 rounds in which there are 25 opportunities
to cooperate and ﬁve opportunities to exit. We then calculate the ratio of the number
of choices of cooperation to all 25 decisions. If the subject belongs to a one-subject
group then decisions are excluded, since choice is indiﬀerent between cooperation and
non-cooperation. This index is based on actual behavior rather than potential attitudes
about cooperation.8 We call this measure an “individual cooperation index.” Of course,
if the group size is diﬀerent, the marginal beneﬁt from cooperation is diﬀerent. We also
set up an adjusted cooperation index. Adjustment proceeds by taking into account that
for lower marginal beneﬁt, the index about cooperation is more weighted; details are
given in Appendix 1.
The second period is the last 5 rounds in which there are 25 opportunities to cooperate
8This kind of measurement is used in Ehrhart and Keser (1999).
9and 4 opportunities to exit.9 With this data, we estimate the exit behavior of individuals.
There are ten sessions in which 17 subjects are included, so that the sample size for
estimation is 4 £ 17 £ 10 = 680. We construct an “exit variable” which takes value one
if a subject exits a group, and is otherwise 0.
We also construct other variables. The ﬁrst is a “cooperation rate of others in the
group,” which is the group’s mean cooperation rate excluding the subject concerned in
the round under consideration. Suppose, for example, that there are four subjects in a
group, and the cooperation rate of Subject 1 is 0.4, the cooperation rate of Subject 2 is
0.6, the cooperation rate of Subject 3 is 0.2 and the cooperation rate of Subject 4 is 0.3.
For Subject 2, the “cooperation rate of others in the group” is f0:4+0:2+0:3g=3 = 0:3.
A second variable is the payoﬀs of the other groups in the current round.10 We call
this variable “other groups’ payoﬀs”.
Using these variables, we consider three hypotheses:
H1: The low “cooperation rate of others in the group” induces subjects to exit.
H2: The high diﬀerence between the “individual cooperation index” and the “coopera-
tion rate of others in the group” induces subjects to exit.
H3: The other groups’ information is a signiﬁcant factor in exiting behavior.
These hypotheses can be paraphrased as follows. First, subjects care about the absolute
level of cooperation of their group members. If the level of cooperation is low, a subject
wishes to leave the group. Second, if one can obtain data about individual cooperation
actions, this is signiﬁcant information. The diﬀerence between an individual’s own pre-
vious cooperation level and the current realized cooperation level of others has an eﬀect
9In the last round, there is no opportunity to exit.
10If there is an empty group in a current round (no subject is in the group), we take 20 yen as the
predicted payoﬀ for the group. This is because 20 yen is the neutral value in our experimental design.
10on exit behavior. This is because the individual cannot tolerate the gap between his/her
intended cooperation level and the realized cooperation level. People care about their
relative cooperation level, compared to others. Third, people care about information
from other groups. This is because such information is important for choosing a group
in exit optioins.
Under these hypotheses, we take the “exit variable” as a dependent variable. Explana-
tory variables are the “cooperation rate of others in the group”, the diﬀerences between
the “individual cooperation index” and the “cooperation rate of others in the group”,
and “other groups’ payoﬀs”
Finally, we comment on the data set. We ﬁrst add the dummy variables for the
50-yen-cost and 0-yen-cost conditions. Second, we omit the “exit variable” for the exits
from single and two subject groups, because the formula for payoﬀs in single and two
subject groups are diﬀerent and the “cooperation rate of others in the group” cannot be
calculated in a single-subject group.
3.3 Estimation and Results
In our models, the dependent variable is the “exit variable,” which is binary data, and
there are individual eﬀects. To estimate parameters we use the probit model with random
eﬀects speciﬁcation for panel data.
To compare diﬀerent formulae, we consider three diﬀerent models. In model 1, the
absolute cooperation level of others (the “cooperation rate of others in the group”) and
the relative cooperation level (the diﬀerence between the “individual cooperation index”
and the “cooperation rate of others in the group”) are included. In models 2 and 3, each
one of these two is included.
11Estimated results are summarized in Table 2. In this table we use abbreviations as
follows:
² Dif(ﬁve): The diﬀerence between the “individual cooperation index” and the “co-
operation rate of others in the group” (the Number of rounds used to construct the
“individual cooperation index”)
² CRO: Cooperation Rate of Others in one’s group
² OGP: Other Group’s Payoﬀ
² D50: Dummy for 50 yen Moving Cost
² D0: Dummy for 0 yen Moving Cost
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡2:457 (0:002)** ¡2:201 (0:005)** ¡2:721 (0:000)**
Dif (ﬁve) 0:794 (0:022)* 1:244 (0:000)**
CRO ¡1:022 (0:047)* ¡1:812 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:013 (0:469) 0:012 (0:533) 0:019 (0:293)
OGP (Mid) 0:041 (0:110) 0:041 (0:121) 0:042 (0:099)+
OGP (Min) 0:022 (0:534) ¡0:026 (0:472) 0:011 (0:748)
D50 ¡0:471 (0:006)** ¡0:477 (0:007)** ¡0:436 (0:010)**
D0 1:449 (0:000)** 1:496 (0:000)** 1:395 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:007** 0:003** 0:012*
Pseudo R2 0:167 0:160 0:161
Number of observations= 620, Number of groups = 169
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 2: Decision on Exits
In addition to this, we use the adjusted cooperation index in which the marginal
beneﬁt of the cooperation is considered (see Appendix 1). In this case,
² aDif(ﬁve) =The deﬁnition is same as Dif(ﬁve) but the adjusted “individual coop-
eration index” is used.
12Table 3 summarizes the estimated results. In this estimation, we consider the same three
distinct models as in previous estimations.
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡2:382 (0:002)** ¡2:201 (0:005)** ¡2:679 (0:001)**
aDif (ﬁve) 0:603 (0:061)+ 1:095 (0:000)**
CRO ¡1:217 (0:015)* ¡1:812 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:013 (0:499) 0:012 (0:533) 0:019 (0:292)
OGP (Mid) 0:039 (0:132) 0:041 (0:121) 0:039 (0:131)
OGP (Min) 0:025 (0:480) ¡0:026 (0:472) ¡0:013 (0:704)
D50 ¡0:489 (0:005)** ¡0:477 (0:007)** ¡0:460 (0:007)**
D0 1:438 (0:000)** 1:496 (0:000)** 1:356 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:005** 0:003** 0:009**
Pseudo R2 0:165 0:160 0:156
Number of observations= 620, Number of groups = 169
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 3: Decision on Exits (adjusted cooperation index)
From Table 2 and 3, we obtain the following results:
Result 1: Hypothesis 1 (H1) is accepted because “CRO” is negative and signiﬁcant.
Result 2: Hypothesis 2 (H2) is accepted because “Dif(ﬁve)” is positive and signiﬁcant.
Result 3: Hypothesis 3 (H3) is rejected because none of “OGP(Max, Mid, Min)” is
signiﬁcant.
From these results, subjects care about the information concerning their own group
mainly. One of the reasons is that the information concerning other groups is less reliable
than the information concerning their own group.
Result 4 Adjusted cooperation index is not better for our estimation because signiﬁ-
cance is at the 10 % level and Pseudo R2 decreases.
13For robustness of thsese results, from Appendix 2, the same results are obtained;
although in some cases the signiﬁcance level is at the 10 % level. For Result 4, we found
that the adjusted “individual cooperation index” is as good as the “individual cooperation
index” in regard to statistical signiﬁcance and Pseudo R2. The results are nevertheless
the same. We can therefore assert that the “individual cooperation index” does not need
to be adjusted.
The “individual cooperation index” is assembled from the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. We can
calculate the same index in the last ﬁve rounds. For these two indexes, we have the
following result:11
Result 5 There is a positive correlation between the “individual cooperation index” and
the same index in the last ﬁve rounds; the correlation coeﬃcient is 0:689.12
Hence, the “individual cooperation index” comprises useful information for predicting
future cooperation behavior.
4 Conclusion
We have investigated the factors that inﬂuence the decision to exit. Our estimated
results are summarized as follows. Subjects care about the absolute level of cooperation
of others. If this is low, subjects tend to exit (Result 1). Also, past experience about
cooperation comprises useful information for exit behavior. The greater is the diﬀerence
between one’s own past cooperation level and the current cooperation level of others,
11The correlation coeﬃcient between the “individual cooperation index” in the ﬁrst one round and in
the last 9 rounds is 0:621. The correlation coeﬃcient between the “individual cooperation index” in the
ﬁrst two round and in the last 8 rounds is 0:683. The correlation coeﬃcient between the “individual
cooperation index” in the ﬁrst three round and in the last 7 rounds is 0:674. The correlation coeﬃcient
between the “individual cooperation index” in the ﬁrst four round and in the last 6 rounds is 0:691. In
all cases, a high correlation is found.
12This relation is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level.
14the higher is the probability that subjects exit to other groups (Result 2). Furthermore,
one’s own past cooperation level and subsequent cooperation level show high correlation
(Result 5). It can be interpreted that subjects with high previous cooperation level are
cooperators. Given these results, cooperators tend to exit to other groups given the same
cooperative level of others. This is because Result 1’s eﬀect is same to both cooperators
and non-cooperators but Result 2’s eﬀect is larger in cooperators than in non-cooperators.
We can draw an important practical lesson from these observations. The cooperators
exit from the groups before the groups’ cooperation rates decrease very much. After the
cooperators have left, the non-cooperators begin to exit. Therefore, to achieve higher
cooperation rates, it is important to create new groups and enclose the cooperators in
the early stages.
Appendix 1
Given the group size, the marginal beneﬁt from cooperation is
r(n) =
8
> > <
> > :
0:75 if n = 2
2=n if n ¸ 3:
(8)
which is drawn in Figure 3. If the group size is one, we do not calculate the cooperation
index from this data.
Consequently, we adjust values using the formula:
ac(n) =
8
> > <
> > :
0:5 if n = 2
2(1 ¡ 2=n) if n ¸ 3:
(9)
15which is drawn in Figure 4.
Figure 3: Marginal beneﬁt from co-
operation
Figure 4: Formula for adjusting co-
operation index
For example: (Case 1) In the ﬁrst round of our experiment, a subject belongs to a
group of size 3 and makes 3 times cooperation decisions to all ﬁve decisions. In the next
round, he/she belongs to a group whose size is 6 and makes 3 times cooperation decisions
to all ﬁve decisions.
By a straightforward calculation, this individual’s cooperation index is
0:6 =
3 + 3
10
: (10)
According to the adjusted method, this individual’s cooperation index is
0:76 =
3 £ 2
¡
1 ¡ 2
5
¢
+ 3 £ 2
¡
1 ¡ 2
6
¢
10
: (11)
16(Case 2) In the ﬁrst round of our experiment, a subject belongs to a group of size
2 and makes 3 times cooperation decisions to all ﬁve decisions. In the next round, this
subject is part of a group of size 4 and makes 3 times cooperation decisions to all ﬁve
decisions. By a straightforward calculation, this individual’s cooperation index is
0:6 =
3 + 3
10
: (12)
On the other hand, under the adjusted method, his/her cooperation index is
0:45 =
3 £ 0:5 + 3 £ 2
¡
1 ¡ 2
4
¢
10
: (13)
These 2 examples conﬁrm that, under lower marginal beneﬁt, the cooperation index
emerges higher, and conversely.
Appendix 2
In this appendix, we list all estimated results in which the period for making “individual
cooperation index” is diﬀerent. “Dif (one)” means that the ﬁrst round, in which there are
5 chances to cooperate, is used for assembling the index. “Dif (two)” means that the ﬁrst
and second rounds, in which there are 10 chances to cooperate, is used for assembling it,
and so on.
If we extend the period, so as to consider “Dif (six)” and “Dif (seven)”, then the
random eﬀects of subjects is not signiﬁcant even at the 10 % level. Hence our results are
listed only as far as “Dif (four)” in this appendix. Note that the case of “Dif (ﬁve)” is
listed in the body of this paper.
17Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:376 (0:004)** ¡1:197 (0:013)* ¡1:630 (0:001)**
Dif (one) 0:594 (0:002)** 0:927 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:866 (0:005)** ¡1:456 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:010 (0:376) 0:008 (0:469) 0:162 (0:180)
OGP (Mid) 0:044 (0:014)* 0:042 (0:018)* 0:049 (0:005)**
OGP (Min) ¡0:020 (0:368) ¡0:016 (0:465) ¡0:034 (0:128)
D50 ¡0:378 (0:001)** ¡0:373 (0:002)** ¡0:358 (0:002)**
D0 1:134 (0:000)** 1:219 (0:000)** 1:069 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:109 0:103 0:104
Number of observations= 1255, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 4: Decision on Exits, one
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:378 (0:004)** ¡1:197 (0:013)* ¡1:635 (0:001)**
aDif (one) 0:587 (0:001)** 0:897 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:871 (0:004)** ¡1:456 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:011 (0:368) 0:008 (0:469) 0:166 (0:169)
OGP (Mid) 0:044 (0:014)* 0:042 (0:018)* 0:050 (0:005)**
OGP (Min) ¡0:021 (0:357) ¡0:016 (0:465) ¡0:035 (0:115)
D50 ¡0:384 (0:001)** ¡0:373 (0:002)** ¡0:367 (0:002)**
D0 1:131 (0:000)** 1:219 (0:000)** 1:066 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:110 0:103 0:104
Number of observations= 1255, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 5: Decision on Exits, one (adjusted cooperation index)
18Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:607 (0:003)** ¡1:382 (0:010)** ¡1:933 (0:000)**
Dif (two) 0:550 (0:027)* 1:005 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:958 (0:008)** ¡1:506 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:008 (0:521) 0:006 (0:635) 0:014 (0:256)
OGP (Mid) 0:041 (0:026)* 0:040 (0:032)* 0:045 (0:014)*
OGP (Min) ¡0:003 (0:898) ¡0:001 (0:966) ¡0:015 (0:558)
D50 ¡0:375 (0:003)** ¡0:377 (0:004)** ¡0:357 (0:005)**
D0 1:212 (0:000)** 1:275 (0:000)** 1:139 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:112 0:108 0:107
Number of observations= 1097, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 6: Decision on Exits, two
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:587 (0:003)** ¡1:382 (0:010)** ¡1:914 (0:000)**
aDif (two) 0:515 (0:022)* 0:934 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:996 (0:004)** ¡1:506 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:008 (0:532) 0:006 (0:635) 0:014 (0:249)
OGP (Mid) 0:041 (0:027)* 0:040 (0:032)* 0:045 (0:013)*
OGP (Min) ¡0:003 (0:894) ¡0:001 (0:966) ¡0:016 (0:513)
D50 ¡0:380 (0:003)** ¡0:377 (0:004)** ¡0:364 (0:004)**
D0 1:203 (0:000)** 1:275 (0:000)** 1:119 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:112 0:108 0:106
Number of observations= 1097, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 7: Decision on Exits, two (adjusted cooperation index)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡2:031 (0:001)** ¡1:810 (0:002)** ¡2:363 (0:000)**
Dif (three) 0:482 (0:072)+ 0:915 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:895 (0:022)* ¡1:381 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:016 (0:237) 0:014 (0:297) 0:022 (0:107)
OGP (Mid) 0:041 (0:040)* 0:039 (0:048)* 0:046 (0:021)*
OGP (Min) 0:001 (0:949) 0:003 (0:906) ¡0:008 (0:758)
D50 ¡0:326 (0:015)* ¡0:325 (0:015)* ¡0:312 (0:020)*
D0 1:297 (0:000)** 1:342 (0:000)** 1:246 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:121 0:118 0:116
Number of observations= 947, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 8: Decision on Exits, three
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡2:008 (0:001)** ¡1:810 (0:002)** ¡2:371 (0:000)**
aDif (three) 0:406 (0:094)+ 0:829 (0:000)**
CRO ¡0:976 (0:009)** ¡1:381 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:016 (0:247) 0:014 (0:297) 0:022 (0:102)
OGP (Mid) 0:040 (0:042)* 0:039 (0:048)* 0:045 (0:022)*
OGP (Min) 0:002 (0:921) 0:003 (0:906) ¡0:008 (0:753)
D50 ¡0:334 (0:012)* ¡0:325 (0:015)* ¡0:326 (0:015)*
D0 1:295 (0:000)** 1:342 (0:000)** 1:232 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
Pseudo R2 0:121 0:118 0:114
Number of observations= 947, Number of groups = 170
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 9: Decision on Exits, three (adjusted cooperation index)
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:872 (0:004)** ¡1:656 (0:009)** ¡2:200 (0:000)**
Dif (four) 0:553 (0:057)+ 1:017 (0:000)**
CRO ¡1:003 (0:019)* ¡1:550 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:018 (0:241) 0:016 (0:299) 0:024 (0:111)
OGP (Mid) 0:034 (0:112) 0:033 (0:124) 0:036 (0:084)+
OGP (Min) 0:000 (0:990) 0:002 (0:934) ¡0:010 (0:736)
D50 ¡0:363 (0:012)* ¡0:360 (0:013)* ¡0:335 (0:019)*
D0 1:368 (0:000)** 1:402 (0:000)** 1:326 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:007** 0:005** 0:009**
Pseudo R2 0:143 0:139 0:137
Number of observations= 787, Number of groups = 169
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 10: Decision on Exits, four
Dependent Variable: Exit Variable (random eﬀects probit regression)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent Variables Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value) Coeﬃcients (p-value)
Constant ¡1:837 (0:004)** ¡1:656 (0:009)** ¡2:189 (0:001)**
aDif (four) 0:462 (0:081)+ 0:919 (0:000)**
CRO ¡1:097 (0:007)** ¡1:550 (0:000)**
OGP (Max) 0:017 (0:257) 0:016 (0:299) 0:024 (0:113)
OGP (Mid) 0:033 (0:124) 0:033 (0:124) 0:035 (0:098)+
OGP (Min) 0:001 (0:950) 0:002 (0:934) ¡0:009 (0:759)
D50 ¡0:373 (0:010)** ¡0:360 (0:013)* ¡0:350 (0:015)*
D0 1:365 (0:000)** 1:402 (0:000)** 1:312 (0:000)**
LR test (zero slope) 0:000** 0:000** 0:000**
LR test (no rand. eﬀ.) 0:007** 0:005** 0:009**
Pseudo R2 0:143 0:139 0:134
Number of observations= 787, Number of groups = 169
¤¤ signiﬁcant at 1 % level, ¤ at 5 % level, + at 10 % level
Table 11: Decision on Exits, four (adjusted cooperation index)
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